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Abstract 
The objective of this article is to analyse the determinants of preferences for 
redistribution in Spain both at an aggregate and regional level. Using country level 
data, we put to the test the Alesina and Angeletos’ (2005) hypothesis, the strong and 
positive relationship between the ‘belief that luck determines income’ and the support 
for redistributive policies. As an innovative contribution, we contrast this hypothesis 
using a set of panel data models with regional and time fixed effects. Our main finding 
is the existence of a structural change in preferences formation for redistribution in 
Spain between 1995 and 2007. Furthermore, the empirical results provide some 
evidence suggesting that (1) the belief that society is unfair have a moderate effect on 
the individuals’ preferences for redistribution and (2) regional beliefs in Spanish 
regions are not equally important when determining demand for redistribution. 
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I. Introduction 
Income inequality has come to take up a central place among the concerns of 
economic and social policies. The last financial crisis has reinforced this trend. For 
example, a recent survey for the World Economic Forum meeting at Davos pointed to 
inequality as the most pressing problem of the coming decade (alongside fiscal 
imbalances). 
A demand-side analysis of the problem of income distribution is especially interesting 
if we assume that, in a democracy, the electorate’s preferences should have a 
significant influence on policy decisions. Indeed, understanding the role of 
governments in the economies of modern democracies requires understanding the 
social attitudes towards income inequality, redistribution and the level of responsibility 
the government should take to ensure that everyone is provided for. For instance, if 
the degree of tax progressivity and the budgetary weight of social spending (i.e. the 
standard mix of redistributive policies) reflects the constituencies’ preferences, the 
analysis of the determinants of those preferences contributes to explaining the 
different levels and forms of redistribution across countries or regions within a 
country. 
Traditionally in economics, models that explain preferences for redistribution focus on 
three types of factors11 For a literature review of the factors influencing preferences 
see Akkoyunlu et al. (2009 Akkoyunlu, S., Neustadt, I. and Zweifel, P. (2009) Why does 
the amount of income redistribution differ between United States and Europe? The 
Janus Face of Switzerland. SOI Working Paper No. 0810, University of Zurich, 
Socioeconomic Institute, Zurich) and Alesina and Giulano (2011).View all notes: 
economic (income, income inequality, earnings mobility, openness of the economy, 
demand of insurance by risk adverse individuals ...), political (electoral 
system/electoral rules, government, political parties ...) and behavioural (beliefs, 
judgement values, social norms ...). Since attitudes towards issues such as the optimal 
level of redistribution are largely a matter of normative belief, an analytical framework 
considering only economic factors is insufficient to explain the formation of this type 
of preferences. Therefore, models which are only based on the assumption of agents 
motivated by narrowly defined self-interest are not successful in predicting demand 
for redistribution. In particular, behavioural economics finds evidence that individuals 
appear to be only imperfectly self-interested. 
The above mentioned value judgments include beliefs about how much of high 
incomes are due to good luck or whether high-income individuals ‘deserve’ their 
incomes. Within the framework of the academic literature dealing with preferences for 
redistribution, Alesina and Angeletos (2005 Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G.-M. (2005) 
Fairness and redistribution, The American Economic Review, 95, 960–80., (henceforth 
AA) concluded that, by using data at a national level, there is a strong and significant 
effect that those societies which believe that individual efforts determine income will 
choose low redistribution policies and low taxes. In order to support their theory 
empirically, they find a strong and significant positive effect between the beliefs that 
luck determines income and the probability of being leftist. More left-wing individuals 
are more pro-distribution. 
The main objective of this article is twofold: (1) to identify the factors determining 
preferences for redistribution in Spain, both at an aggregate and regional level and (2) 
to test the existence of a structural change in those preferences formation between 
1995 and 2007. We are especially interested in knowing to what extent individual 
preferences for redistribution have a non-economic substrate and, particularly, in 
verifying whether the belief that society is unfair has a significant positive effect on the 
support for redistribution. 
In order to address the above mentioned research question(s) we test the same 
hypotheses as AA on fairness and preferences for redistribution, but we go further and 
our results clearly differ from those obtained by these authors. Particularly, the 
contribution of the present article to the empirical literature on determinants for 
individual preferences for redistribution can be summarized as follows. 
First, we want to find out if the relationship also holds at a regional level in Spain and if 
all regional beliefs in all regions are equally important when determining demand for 
redistribution. In order to do that, we introduce both belief-fixed effects (from the best 
of our knowledge, we believe that we are the first in the literature to do so) and 
regional-fixed effects (following García-Valiñas et al. (2008)) in the analysis. 
Considering data at a regional level allows us to uncover aspects that would otherwise 
be hidden if we aggregate at a national level. The effects of aggregation in a time series 
are well-known in the literature (see e.g. Rossana and Seater, 1995 Wooldridge, J. M. 
(2008) Introductory Econometrics: A ModernApproach, 4th edn, South-Western 
College, Mason, OH.). 
Second, in this article we also analyse the evolution over time of the determinants of 
preferences for redistribution. For example, Fatás (1997 Fatás, A. (1997) EMU: 
countries or regions? Lessons from theEMS experience, European Economic Review, 
41, 743–51) argues that correlations within countries have been decreasing over time 
while cross-country correlations have increased, and we may expect changes over time 
also in the function of preferences for distribution. 
Third, AA use the variable ‘being left on the political spectrum’ as a proxy of the 
preferences for redistribution. Additionally, we find out if the results when using the 
AA specification about the determinants on ideological beliefs can also be translated 
into determinants in preferences of income equality and government redistribution in 
Spain. 
Spain is a good country to consider for a number of reasons. First, the problem of 
inequality of income distribution and its evolution over time is relevant. According to 
the latest data published by Eurostat, Spain stands out for its high–income inequality 
compared to other European countries (the highest in the eurozone). The Gini index 
value in 2010 (33.9) lays significantly above the European Union average in 2011 and 
continued to rise. Second, Spain is not a homogeneous country. It was a highly 
centralized state turned into a very decentralized one in which there are important 
cultural, linguistic and historical differences across regions. Therefore, it is interesting 
to analyse to what extent heterogeneity among individual preferences could become a 
driving force of decentralization. This idea has been developed in demand-driven 
median-voter type models (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997 Alesina, A. and Spolaore, E. 
(1997) On the number and size of nations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1027–
56.; Panizza, 1999 Piketty, T. (1995) Social mobility and redistributive politics, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 551–84. Finally, if there is heterogeneity of 
preferences across regions within the country, hardly a centralized policy could meet 
citizens’ demands. In the Spanish case, some of the main redistribution policies are in 
the hands of the central government and some subnational governments claim to be 
more capable than the central administration of meeting their constituencies’ 
preferences and demands for public goods and services. For this kind of reasons, a 
special motivation for this research comes from its policy relevance, because it is tied 
to new facts or trends, and produced in a timely way that can impact policy debate. 
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section II, we present the theoretical 
framework, the data and descriptive statistics. Section III contains the main results. 
Finally, Section IV concludes. A definition of the variables and the models that are used 
in the article is given in Appendix 1, and all tables are collected in Appendix 2. 
II. Analytical Framework, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In general terms, the analytical framework that offers a reasonable explanation to the 
positioning of a society on the fairness of market outcomes and the role of 
government in the economy, is provided by a growing literature that has addressed 
the determinants of demand for redistribution.22 Benabou and Ok (2001), Alesina and 
Angeletos (2005 Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G.-M. (2005) Fairness and redistribution, 
The American Economic Review, 95, 960–80.) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005 
Alesina, A., Glaeser, E. and Sacerdote, B. (2001) Why doesn’t the United States have a 
European-style welfare state?, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 187–277. 
View all notes These factors are grouped into three main categories: economic, 
political and behavioural. In our case, taking into account the objective of this article, 
we will focus primarily on the first two. 
A priori, income levels and its interpersonal distribution can be good predictors of 
individual attitudes towards redistribution. In principle, as indicated Romer (1975 
Rossana, R. J. and Seater, J. J. (1995) Temporal aggregation and economic time series, 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 13, 441–51.,) and Meltzer and Richard 
(1981 Neher, F. (2012) Preferences for redistribution around the world, School of 
Business & Economics Discussion Paper: Economics, No. 2012/2. Available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55522 (accessed 26 February 2013), individuals with 
higher (lower) incomes have a lower (higher) probability of supporting redistribution 
and vice versa. In particular, Richard and Meltzer base their reasoning on the median–
voter theorem. Technically, a higher level of market-generated inequality implies a 
greater distance between the mean and the median income (before taxes and 
transfers). In this situation the latter will be considerably below the first. The lower the 
median income in relation with the average, the more profit the individual or the 
family situated in the median of redistributive policies will get. This individual or family 
will receive transfers that exceed their contribution via tax burden. 
Furthermore, according to Alesina and La Ferrara (2005 Alesina, A., Glaeser, E. and 
Sacerdote, B. (2001) Why doesn’t the United States have a European-style welfare 
state?, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 187–277.), as occurs with 
redistribution of the richest to the poorest, one would expect the latter to have a more 
favourable stance and the first to pose greater opposition. This argument connects 
with an approach that is widely accepted and which emphasizes the influence of 
individual characteristics (personal circumstances) on attitudes towards redistributive 
policies. This is a version of what has been called the ‘private interest hypothesis’, 
which assumes that those who are or may potentially benefit from the programme of 
the welfare state are more likely to report a more favourable opinion on such policy. 
Recently, Alesina and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences 
for redistribution in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–
931.) provide a literature review of what determines the preferences of individuals for 
redistribution, and among other issues, they empirically confirm facts such as in 
general, in the United States of America, blacks, the less rich people, women (in the 
United States of America, women are more left-wing than men – see e.g. Alesina and 
La Ferrara (2005 Alesina, A., Glaeser, E. and Sacerdote, B. (2001) Why doesn’t the 
United States have a European-style welfare state?, Brooking Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2, 187–277.), the less educated people and left-wing people are more in 
favour of redistribution. 
Other approaches focus their explanations not only on the characteristics of income 
distribution but also in the social and cultural determinants of the process of 
preferences formation. Then, the initial hypothesis proposed by Hirschman and 
Rothschild (1973 Iglesias-Fernández, C., Llorente-Heras, R. and Dueñas-Fernández, D. 
(2009) La Segregación Laboral for Razón de Género en España: In Análisis Regional, VIII 
Jornadas de Economía Laboral. ) and confirmed later by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005 
Alesina, A., Glaeser, E. and Sacerdote, B. (2001) Why doesn’t the United States have a 
European-style welfare state?, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 187–277.), 
highlights that expectations of social mobility are crucial to reduce the individuals will 
to redistribute. However, this explanation continues to be insufficient since those 
individuals that have moved up in their social scale do not tend to show a reduction in 
their redistribution demand (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, 
E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public 
Economics, 89, 897–931). On the other hand, contractualism tends to interpret 
redistribution policies as a demand for personal reassurances. However, experimental 
results show that risk aversion is very inferior to the rawlsian proposal of the maximin 
rule (see Beck, 1994 Beck, J. (1994) An experimental test of preferences for the 
distribution of income and individual risk aversion, Eastern Economic Journal, 20, 131–
45. ; Cabrales et al., 2012 Cabrales, A., Nagel, R. and Rodríguez-Mora, J. V. (2012) It is 
hobbes, not rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution, Experimental 
Economics, 15, 278–308.). 
Without doubt, both approaches are linked to the existence of a justice idea, i.e., 
individual perceptions are based on a certain subjective point of view of what is fair in 
terms of what they deserve (see Alesina and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, 
E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public 
Economics, 89, 897–931.)). In more detail, the redistribution will is linked to the 
existence of randomness of income distribution that is not linked to effort, since lack 
of it is related to the explained primacy of effort. In this way, more equality due to luck 
seems more desirable than when it is derived from effort. Obviously, the formation of 
these type of beliefs can be very attached to personal history (see Piketty, 1995 Rey-
Biel, P., Sheremeta, R. and Uler, N. (2011) (Bad) Luck or (Lack of) Effort?: comparing 
social sharing norms between US and Europe, Barcelona GSE Working Papers Series 
No. 584, Barcelona. [Google Scholar]) or characteristics that are proper of cultures 
where individuals are more or less risk averse (see Alesina and Glaesser, 2004; 
Benabou and Tirole, 2005; Rey-Biel et al., 2011 Romer, T. (1975) Individual welfare, 
majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax, Journal of Public Economics, 
4, 163–85.). 
Dataset and descriptive statistics 
The individual level data is taken from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the 
European Values Survey (EVS). The WVS is probably one of the most well–known 
surveys that have been carried out to analyse in practice issues of social welfare. 
Examples of papers that have used this survey at an aggregate level by considering 
countries as individual units are Guiso et al. (2003 Hirschman, A. O. and Rothschild, M. 
(1973) The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic 
eevelopment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 544–66.), (religion issues), 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005 Alesina, A., Glaeser, E. and Sacerdote, B. (2001) Why 
doesn’t the United States have a European-style welfare state?, Brooking Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2, 187–277.) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005 Alesina, A. and 
Angeletos, G.-M. (2005) Fairness and redistribution, The American Economic Review, 
95, 960–80.) (preferences for redistribution in relation to mean income), Fortin (2005 
García-Valiñas, M. A., Fernández-Llera, R. and Torgler, B. (2008) More income equality 
or not? An empirical analysis of individuals’ preferences for redistribution, Discussion 
Paper and Working Paper Series #226, Queensland University of Technology, School of 
Economics and Finance, Brisbane, QLD.) (gender role attitudes and work values on 
women’s labour-market outcomes), Blekesaune (2007 Blekesaune, M. (2007) 
Economic conditions and public attitudes to welfare policies, European Sociological 
Review, 23, 393–403.) (public opinions towards welfare state policies), Landier et al. 
(2008 Luttmer, E. F. P. (2001) Group loyalty and taste for redistribution, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 109, 500–28. ) (analysing pro-capitalism issues) and Fischer 
(2008 Fong, C., Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2006) Strong reciprocity and the welfare 
state, in Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, (Eds.) S. -C. 
Kolm and J. M. Ythier, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Vol. 2.) (effects of competition in trust). 
The WVS Network provides a harmonized file of European data extending over five 
survey waves carried out around 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. We have data for 
Spain for the waves of years 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2007, corresponding to the 
most recent periods that are available nowadays in the WVS. However, we can only 
get all the data we need to carry out the analysis of AA for 1995 and 2007 in Spain (see 
Appendix 1 for more details about the availability of the data and a list of all the 
variables we use) and that is why we only study those 2 years. More specifically, we do 
not have access to any of the variables for 1980, VAR5 in 1990 and VAR1 for the wave 
of 2000 in Spain. 
Those individuals where at least one of the variables show a ‘no-answer’ were 
removed from the sample. In 1995, we have originally 1211 individuals, and we 
are left with 433 individuals.33 That implies that we may have some issues with 
the sample representativeness. Some methods to guarantee the 
representativeness involve the use of weights (see for example Ayala et al., 
2006 Ayala, L., Navarro, C. and Sastre, M. (2006), La Attrition en el Panel de 
Hogares de la Unión Europea: ¿Cómo influye en la Movilidad de Ingresos?, XIII 
Encuentro de Economía Poíltica, Almería. ); however, in our case it is not 
obvious how those weights may be implemented. We have checked that the 
descriptive statistics of all variables did not change substantially when we have 
removed from the sample those individuals where at least one of the variables 
show a ‘no-answer’. Even so, we acknowledge that our results mainly for 1995 
may be affected by sample selection issues.View all notes For 2007, we start 
with a sample of 1200 individuals and after removing those individuals without 
an answer, we are left with 899 individuals.44 Tables with the descriptive 
statistics of all variables (including those that we need to analyse the setting of 
García-Valiñas et al. (2008) and Alesina and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La 
Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, 
Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931.,) can be obtained from any of the 
authors upon request.View all notes From descriptive statistics of all variables 
in 1995, we note that, for example, VAR6 corresponds to 98.9% of white 
respondents in Spain that are white. This reflects that the population situation 
in Spain is very different to the setting of AA, and it explains why for example in 
our case, variables such as race (VAR6) are not statistically relevant in our 
analysis when we introduce them into the model. VAR6 is not available in the 
WVS for Spain in 2007, but given the demographic structure of Spain where 
most of the population is white, we argue that this variable is not relevant for 
the Spanish setting. 
III. Empirical Analysis and Results 
Empirical strategy 
First, we rely on the specification given in Table 2 in AA (page 964) in which they find a 
strong and positive relationship between the ‘belief that luck determines income’ on 
the ‘probability of being leftist’.  
Table 1. The effect of the belief that luck determines income on individual 
political orientation in Spain in 1995 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
Aggregate belief           
 VAR1 –0.033 (–0.41) –0.033 (–0.41) –0.010 (–0.12) –0.010 (–0.12) − 
Geography/income           
 VAR2 − 0.318 (0.41) − − − 
 VAR3 –0.013 (–0.94) –0.012 (–0.87) –0.001 (–0.07) − − 
 VAR4 0.020 (1.92)* 0.020 (1.91)* 0.018 (1.72)* 0.021 (2.10)** 0.021 (2.10)** 
Sociodemography           
 VAR5 –0.032 (–2.88)*** –0.033 (–2.90)*** –0.031 (–2.68)*** –0.026 (–2.81)*** –0.026 (–2.82)*** 
 VAR6 –0.112 (–0.55) –0.124 (–0.60) –0.088 (–0.41) − − 
 VAR7 –0.038 (–0.57) –0.038 (–0.57) –0.049 (–0.73) − − 
 VAR8 –0.019 (–1.10) –0.018 (–1.05) –0.018 (–1.05) –0.030 (–1.98)** –0.030 (–2.00)** 
 VAR9 –0.057 (–1.26) –0.058 (–1.27) –0.042 (–0.91) − − 
 VAR10 0.051 (0.53) 0.046 (0.47) 0.041 (0.40) − − 
 VAR11 0.013 (0.09) 0.014 (0.10) –0.068 (–0.48) − − 
 VAR12 0.069 (0.83) 0.067 (0.80) 0.038 (0.45) − − 
 VAR13 0.118 (1.64) 0.116 (1.60) 0.074 (1.00) − − 
 VAR14 –0.032 (–0.42) –0.035 (–0.47) –0.046 (–0.62) − − 
 VAR15 0.011 (0.15) 0.008 (0.11) –0.023 (–0.33) − − 
Constant 0.950 (4.15)*** 0.862 (2.77)*** 0.958 (3.96)*** 0.807 (9.86)*** 0.803 (10.74)*** 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.07 
Models 6 7 8 9 10 
Aggregate belief           
 VAR1 –0.099 (–1.04) –0.074 (–0.85) –0.078 (–0.90) − − 
Geography/income           
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
 VAR2 − − − − − 
 VAR3 –0.005 (–0.30) − − − − 
 VAR4 0.014 (1.24) 0.017 (1.69)* 0.021 (2.04)** − − 
Sociodemography           
 VAR5 –0.030 (–2.64)*** –0.026 (–2.76)*** –0.028 (–2.99)*** –0.023 (–2.56)** –0.020 (–2.24)** 
 VAR6 –0.107 (–0.50) − − − − 
 VAR7 –0.058 (–0.86) − − − − 
 VAR8 –0.018 (–1.02) –0.030 (–1.99)** –0.030 (–1.95)* –0.029 (–1.90)* − 
 VAR9 –0.053 (–1.14) − − − − 
 VAR10 0.060 (0.60) − − − − 
 VAR11 –0.067 (–0.47) − − − − 
 VAR12 0.054 (0.63) − − − − 
 VAR13 0.090 (1.21) − − − − 
 VAR14 –0.040 (–0.54) − − − − 
 VAR15 –0.020 (–0.28) − − − − 
Constant 1.061 (4.33)*** 0.854 (10.03)*** 0.827 (9.72)*** 0.884 (14.53)*** 0.797 (19.80)*** 
R-squared 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
Regional fixed effects           
 VAR16AN − − –0.004 (–0.05) − − 
 VAR16AR − − –0.245 (–1.66)* − − 
 VAR16AS − − 0.043 (0.30) − − 
 VAR16B − − –0.063 (–0.43) − − 
 VAR16CAT − − 0.024 (0.25) − − 
 VAR16CANA − − –0.031 (–0.25) − − 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
 VAR16CANT − − –0.220 (–1.02) − − 
 VAR16CASLE − − –0.082 (–0.76) − − 
 VAR16CASLA − − –0.070 (–0.52) − − 
 VAR16E − − 0.075 (0.50) − − 
 VAR16G − − 0.004 (0.04) − − 
 VAR16R − − –0.074 (–0.25) − − 
 VAR16MA − − –0.163 (–1.82)* –0.150 (–2.44)** –0.151 (–2.44)** 
 VAR16MU − − –0.162 (–1.20) − − 
 VAR16NA − − –0.329 (–1.85)* –0.314 (–1.96)* –0.314 (–1.96)* 
 VAR16PVAS − − –0.390 (–2.33)** –0.385 (–2.55)** –0.385 (–2.56)** 
Regional belief–fixed effects           
 VAR1MA − − − − − 
 VAR1NA − − − − − 
 VAR1PVAS − − − − − 
Models 6 7 8 9 10 
Regional fixed effects           
 VAR16AN –0.014 (–0.17) − − − − 
 VAR16AR –0.256 (–1.74)* − − − − 
 VAR16AS 0.025 (0.17) − − − − 
 VAR16B –0.083 (–0.56) − − − − 
 VAR16CAT 0.002 (0.02) − − − − 
 VAR16CANA –0.030 (–0.24) − − − − 
 VAR16CANT –0.217 (–1.01) − − − − 
 VAR16CASLE –0.094 (–0.87) − − − − 
 VAR16CASLA –0.090 (–0.68) − − − − 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
 VAR16E 0.056 (0.38) − − − − 
 VAR16G –0.013 (–0.13) − − − − 
 VAR16R –0.053 (–0.18) − − − − 
 VAR16MA –0.374 (–2.87)*** –0.317 (–2.95)*** –0.298 (–2.76)*** –0.278 (–2.72)*** –0.267 (–2.62)*** 
 VAR16MU –0.172 (–1.28) − − − − 
 VAR16NA –0.391 (–0.84) –0.320 (–0.71) − − − 
 VAR16PVAS –0.193 (–0.54) –0.195 (–0.57) − − − 
Regional belief–fixed effects       − − 
 VAR1MA 0.478 (2.23)** 0.392 (1.91)* 0.383 (1.85)* 0.371 (2.00)** 0.359 (1.93)* 
 VAR1NA 0.125 (0.12) –0.002 (–0.00) − − − 
 VAR1PVAS –0.483 (–0.65) –0.456 (–0.63) − − − 
Notes: We report OLS estimates with t-statistics in parenthesis (*significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%). As in AA, 
Probit and Logit also give similar results than OLS. 
  
Table 2. The effect of the belief that luck determines income on individual political orientation in Spain in 2007 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
Aggregate belief           
 VAR1 0.126 (1.83)* 0.121 (1.75)* 0.050 (0.72) 0.070 (1.03) -- 
Geography/income           
 VAR2 -- –1.299 (–1.21) -- -- -- 
 VAR3 –0.044 (–4.40)*** –0.045 (–4.48)*** –0.053 (–5.11)*** –0.049 (–5.32)*** –0.048 (–5.30)*** 
 VAR4 –0.004 (–0.60) –0.003 (–0.47) –0.002 (–0.23) -- -- 
Socio-demography           
 VAR5 0.012 (1.55) 0.012 (1.49) 0.011 (1.39) -- -- 
 VAR6 -- -- -- -- -- 
 VAR7 0.012 (0.36) 0.016 (0.46) 0.016 (0.46) -- -- 
 VAR8 –0.018 (–1.36) –0.019 (–1.40) –0.019 (–1.40) -- -- 
 VAR9 0.032 (1.10) 0.032 (1.11) 0.025 (0.89) -- -- 
 VAR10 –0.230 (–2.30)** –0.220 (–2.18) –0.160 (–1.55) -- -- 
 VAR11 0.204 (3.25)*** 0.205 (3.28)*** 0.208 (3.36)*** 0.259 (4.92)*** 0.260 (4.93)*** 
 VAR12 0.173 (3.22)*** 0.174 (3.23)*** 0.214 (4.00)*** 0.261 (5.62)*** 0.263 (5.67)*** 
 VAR13 0.128 (2.56)** 0.126 (2.52)** 0.126 (2.56)** 0.160 (3.54)*** 0.162 (3.59)*** 
 VAR14 0.124 (2.48)** 0.123 (2.46)** 0.126 (2.57)*** 0.146 (3.08)*** 0.148 (3.11)*** 
 VAR15 0.146 (2.73)*** 0.145 (2.72)*** 0.156 (3.00)*** 0.162 (3.17)*** 0.163 (3.19)*** 
Constant 0.825 (9.82)*** 1.141 (4.15)*** 0.810 (8.68)*** 0.759 (14.05)*** 0.785 (16.41)*** 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.11 
Models 6 7 8 9 10 
Aggregate belief           
 VAR1 0.067 (0.82) 0.084 (1.23) 0.076 (1.11) -- -- 
Geography/income           
 VAR2 -- -- -- -- -- 
 VAR3 –0.053 (–5.10)*** –0.038 (–4.18)*** –0.039 (–4.35)*** –0.038 (–4.17)*** –0.039 (–4.33)*** 
 VAR4 –0.002 (–0.26) -- -- -- -- 
Socio-demography           
 VAR5 0.011 (1.39) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR6 -- -- -- -- -- 
 VAR7 0.019 (0.53) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR8 –0.019 (–1.42) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR9 0.027 (0.93) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR10 –0.159 (–1.54) –0.210 (–2.14)** -- –0.209 (–2.08)** -- 
 VAR11 0.207 (3.34)*** 0.258 (4.85)*** 0.257 (4.82)*** 0.259 (4.86)*** 0.258 (4.83)*** 
 VAR12 0.215 (4.00)*** 0.235 (5.05)*** 0.235 (5.04)*** 0.239 (5.12)*** 0.238 (5.11)*** 
 VAR13 0.124 (2.50)** 0.163 (3.58)*** 0.160 (3.52)*** 0.166 (3.65)*** 0.163 (3.58)*** 
 VAR14 0.124 (2.52)** 0.139 (2.91)*** 0.140 (2.92)*** 0.141 (2.94)*** 0.142 (2.96)*** 
 VAR15 0.155 (2.97)*** 0.154 (2.97)*** 0.156 (3.00)*** 0.155 (3.00)*** 0.157 (3.03)*** 
Constant 0.803 (8.46)*** 0.775 (12.05)*** 0.698 (13.07)*** 0.804 (13.44)*** 0.726 (15.52)*** 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
R2 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
Regional fixed effects           
 VAR16AN -- -- 0.040 (0.73) -- -- 
 VAR16AR -- -- –0.095 (–0.97)* -- -- 
 VAR16AS -- -- 0.133 (1.45) -- -- 
 VAR16B -- -- 0.135 (1.30) -- -- 
 VAR16CAT -- -- 0.235 (4.33)*** 0.209 (5.41)*** 0.214 (5.56)*** 
 VAR16CANA -- -- 0.095 (0.89) -- -- 
 VAR16CANT -- -- –0.178 (–1.00) -- -- 
 VAR16CASLE -- -- 0.069 (1.01) -- -- 
 VAR16CASLA -- -- –0.181 (–2.32)** –0.219 (–3.22)*** –0.224 (–3.30)*** 
 VAR16E -- -- 0.033 (0.29) -- -- 
 VAR16G -- -- –0.137 (–1.96)** –0.184 (–3.24)*** –0.178 (–3.15)*** 
 VAR16R -- -- –0.004 (–0.02) -- -- 
 VAR16MA -- -- 0.024 (0.43) -- -- 
 VAR16MU -- -- –0.140 (–1.56) -- -- 
 VAR16NA -- -- 0.386 (2.74)*** 0.364 (2.69)*** 0.374 (2.77)*** 
 VAR16PVAS -- -- 0.105 (1.43) -- -- 
Regional belief–fixed effects           
 VAR1CAT -- -- -- -- -- 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
 VAR1CASLA -- -- -- -- -- 
 VAR1G -- -- -- -- -- 
 VAR1NA -- -- -- -- -- 
Models 6 7 8 9 10 
Regional fixed effects           
 VAR16AN 0.039 (0.71) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16AR –0.095 (–0.98) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16AS 0.132 (1.43) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16B 0.133 (1.27) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16CAT 0.241 (2.50)** 0.228 (5.91)*** 0.230 (5.94)*** 0.233 (6.07)*** 0.234 (6.09)*** 
 VAR16CANA 0.096 (0.89) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16CANT –0.177 (–1.00) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16CASLE 0.070 (1.01) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16CASLA –0.170 (–1.16) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16E 0.034 (0.29) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16G 0.001 (0.01) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16R –0.001 (–0.01) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16MA 0.023 (0.41) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16MU –0.138 (–1.53) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16NA 0.563 (0.61) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR16PVAS 0.104 (1.41) -- -- -- -- 
Dependent variable: being left on the political spectrum 
Regional belief– fixed effects       -- -- 
 VAR1CAT –0.016 (–0.09) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR1CASLA –0.033 (–0.09) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR1G –0.288 (–0.82) -- -- -- -- 
 VAR1NA –0.325 (–0.20) -- -- -- -- 
                      
Note: We report OLS estimates with t-statistics in parenthesis (*significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%). As in AA, 
Probit and Logit also give similar results than OLS. 
  
In order to test and to extend the analysis of AA to Spain, our basic model is specified 
as follows:  
where DEP  is the preference for redistribution of individual i in region j at period t 
and it depends on a set of economic and socioeconomic control variables and 
region J and time T fixed effects.55 A more detailed description of the variables can be 
seen in Appendix 1. A very similar specification can be found in Neher (2012 Panizza, 
U. (1999) On the determinants of fiscal centralization: theory and evidence, Journal of 
Public Economics, 74, 97–139.).View all notes 
The dependent variable corresponds to ‘Being left on the political spectrum’. It 
answers the question at the aggregate (all regions) level in Spain: ‘In political matters, 
people talk of left and right. How would you place your views on this scale, generally 
speaking?’ This choice of this variable as proxy of demand for redistribution can be 
justified because liberals and conservatives tend to disagree about the role of luck in 
financial success, the former thinking it plays a very big role, the latter thinking it plays 
a small role: that instead financial success is largely attributable to talent and hard 
work. 
In our case, using the information on the ideological self-positioning of individuals, we 
come across some interesting facts about the link between ideology and the demand 
for redistribution. In fact, in the Spanish case a clear correspondence is detected 
between leftist ideology and greater preference for equality in the distribution of 
income and, consequently, for the implementation of redistributive policies. 
However, in order to verify the robustness, we extend the AA (2005) model, estimating 
two additional models in which the dependent variables are the most commonly used 
in the literature as proxy for preferences for redistribution. First, following, Alesina and 
Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the 
land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931.) we use the variable 
‘preferences for government redistribution’ (VAR17 in our notation) as a dependent 
variable. Second, we also consider preferences for income inequality, which are 
interpreted as preferences for redistribution. For instance, García-Valiñas et al. (2008) 
use the variable ‘preferences for income equality’ (VAR17* in our notation) instead of 
‘being leftist’ (i.e. DEP) as the dependent variable. 
In order to interpret the values of these variables, note that they reflect how the 
individual place his views on a scale in which 1 means he agrees completely with the 
statement that incomes should be made more equal (VAR 17*) or the government 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for (VAR17), 10 
means you agree completely with the statement that we need larger income 
differences as incentives for individual effort (VAR17*, people should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves (VAR17). 
Initially, we use the same set of independent variables as AA. Individual belief that luck 
determines income (VAR1) corresponds to the answer to the question: ‘In the long run, 
hard work usually brings a better life. Or, hard work does not generally bring success; 
it’s more a matter of luck and connections’. This variable measures the belief in the 
relation between hard work and success, i.e. the fairness of the distributive system. 
As income variables we introduce income (VAR3) and income distribution (VAR2) 
proxied by the ‘Gini Index’ to characterize the inequality. In order to control 
sociodemographic characteristics of individuals, we include as independent variables 
the most common used in the literature addressing preferences for redistribution: city 
population (VAR 4), years of education (VAR5), race (VAR6), marital status (VAR7), 
number of children (VAR8), gender (VAR9), national identity (VAR10) and age (VAR11 
to VAR15) 
In addition to the above mentioned variables, we incorporate a new variable that is 
not included in AA. VAR16: ‘Region where the survey was carried out’ in Spain. This 
allows us to introduce regional-fixed effects (for Spain). The regional fixed effect in a 
specific region indicates the relevance of a strong right/left-wing group in that region. 
We argue that these regional–fixed effects need to be incorporated into the model of 
AA in countries with characteristics such as those in Spain, where regions can be very 
heterogeneous from the socioeconomic point of view. 
Furthermore, the existence of regional beliefs fixed effect in a region reflects that 
regional beliefs on the role of luck and effort in that region are representative of the 
political orientation and the attitudes towards redistribution policies. In order to 
introduce these belief-fixed effects in the analysis, we have created several variables 
that were not used in AA. For example, VAR1MA represent the iteration effect of the 
belief that luck determines income (VAR1) with the regional–fixed effect in Madrid 
(VAR16MA). 
To account for unobserved cultural determinants, as a robustness check, in our 
extension of the model of AA we also consider the specification given in table 7 in 
Alesina and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for 
redistribution in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931.) 
to include in all regressions regional–fixed effects and regional belief-fixed effects in 
Spain. 
Finally, we also estimated a panel data setting where time dummies were introduced 
as time fixed effects, and the results that are presented here for each of the waves 
(1995 and 2007) were robust to that. 
Discussion of results 
We provide now detailed results we obtained for 1995 and 2007. All results have been 
obtained using STATA 11.0. Tables 1 and 2 show the estimation results, by ordinary 
least squares (OLS), with t-statistics in parenthesis. To confirm the robustness of our 
results, we consider the ten model specifications described in Appendix 1 for 1995 (in 
order to develop the analysis for Spain in 2007, we continue with the same procedure 
as in 1995 and with the same ten models). 
Year 1995 
From Models 1, 2 and 3, we can see how the individual belief that luck determines 
income (VAR1) does not show a statistically significant relationship with being left on 
the political spectrum (DEP). The variables that show statistically significant 
relationships are city population (VAR4) and years of education (VAR5). Additionally, 
from Models 1, 2 and 3 we identify the main regions to take into account in relation to 
the fixed effects (Madrid, Navarra and País Vasco). 
In Model 4, we find that variables such as age group, sex and marital status are not 
relevant in Spain. City population, years of education and the number of children are 
the most important issues. In Model 4, we can see how the signs of the point estimates 
of these three variables are the same for those variables that are in common with the 
results in AA (table 2, p. 964); the only difference once again being that VAR1 does not 
show a statistically significant relationship with DEP in our case. Moreover, we observe 
how in Madrid, Navarra and País Vasco there are statistically significant regional–fixed 
effects. This shows that in those regions there were stronger right–wing beliefs than in 
the rest of Spain. The evidence in Madrid is even stronger than in Navarra and País 
Vasco. This evidence suggests that regional beliefs in Madrid are representative of the 
political orientation and the attitudes towards redistribution. Particularly, the negative 
estimated sign, supports the hypothesis that those individuals living in Madrid are 
more adverse to redistribution. 
In Model 5, we then proceed as in Model 1 in AA (table 2, p. 964) to remove VAR1 
from the analysis. Following Wooldridge (2008), we can create iteration effects (along 
the same lines as when we want to find out if the returns from education have 
changed over time) and we proceed to incorporate regional beliefs at a disaggregated 
level for Madrid, Navarra and País Vasco, since these show a statistical significant 
relationship in our Model 3. 
Model 6 corresponds to Model 2 in AA (table 2, p. 964) and shows how in 1995 the 
relationship of beliefs that luck determines income and the dependent variable (being 
left on the political spectrum) only holds in one region (Madrid), but not at an 
aggregate level (i.e. VAR1). In Model 6, again VAR1 is not statistically significant, but 
VAR1MA is highly significant and with the expected positive sign. 
After removing those variables that are not statistically significant in Model 6, in Model 
7, we find a positive relationship between city population and being a left-wing 
individual. Years of education (VAR5) is also found to have a negative relationship with 
being left-wing. Also, the larger the number of children (VAR8), the more adverse 
individuals are to redistribution and higher taxes. This also occurs in the USA economy 
in for example Alesina and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) 
Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 
89, 897–931), where more educated people with more children tend to be more 
adverse to redistribution and higher taxes. However, contrary to AA, we do not find a 
statistically significant relationship between VAR1 and DEP at an aggregate level, but 
we find it when we use regional beliefs in Madrid: that is, we find a strong positive 
relationship of 0.478 when using regional beliefs 
Finally, in Models 9 and 10 we remove VAR1 and VAR4 to check the robustness of our 
result that shows the strong positive relationship between regional beliefs in Madrid 
VAR1MA) and ideological self-placement. 
In summary, note that AA (table 2, p. 964) find at an aggregate (country) level a strong 
and positive significant influence of VAR1 on DEP in the range of 0.541–0.607. In our 
case, in 1995 (Table 1), we do not find an influence in Spain of VAR1 at aggregate level 
on DEP (note that this result is robust in all Models 1–10 as it is shown in bold in Tables 
1 and 2). 
However, from the regional belief effects, we find in 1995 a strong positive and 
significant effect of the belief in Madrid of the regional belief in Madrid that luck 
determines income (i.e. VAR1MA) on the probability of being leftist (DEP) (again, this 
result is robust in all Models 1–10 as it is shown in Tables 1 and 2 in bold. A possible 
explanation of our results is that Spanish regions have very different beliefs, and at 
aggregate level, it is not possible to uncover relationships that can explain the 
preferences for redistribution policies. More specifically, this evidence may be linked 
to the singular political situation of this region in Spain. In the definition of political 
orientation of Madrid, nationalist concerns are not determinant (since it is the capital 
of Spain), but economic and redistributional factors are more important. In this way, 
this may explain why variables such as preferences on equality and governmental and 
individual responsibilities are not statistically significant. 
We also find very strong evidence that years of education in Spain have a negative 
impact on the probability of being left-wing and therefore, higher educational 
achievements significantly reduce the probability of strong preferences for 
redistribution. Note that in all Models 1–10, years of education (VAR5) is always 
statistically significant and with a negative sign. However, variables such as race, 
marital status, age or gender are not relevant in Spain. 
In order to show the robustness of our results when we change our dependent 
variable from DEP to preferences for government redistribution (VAR17) and 
preferences for income equality (VAR17*), we report the results in Table 3. First, we 
show the dependence between DEP and VAR17*, and we also show the robustness of 
our results when we replace DEP by VAR17* in our previous model. We use the same 
variables as in table 7 in Alesina and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) 
Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 
89, 897–931.) and therefore we create a variable that measures years of education 
through attendance to high school (VAR21) and to college or higher (VAR22).  
  
Table 3. The effect of the belief that luck determines income on being left 
on the political spectrum (DEP), income distribution (VAR17*) and 
government distribution (VAR17) in Spain in 1995 
Dependent variable 
Models VAR17 VAR17* VAR17 DEP VAR17 VAR17* 
VAR17* -- -- 0.193 -- -- -- 
  -- -- (5.13)*** -- -- -- 
VAR17 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
DEP 0.078 0.370 -- -- -- -- 
  (1.86)* (10.11)*** -- -- -- -- 
Aggregate             
belief             
VAR1 -- -- -- 0.003 –0.012 0.005 
  -- -- -- (0.65) (–2.84)*** (1.21) 
Socio-             
demography             
VAR21 -- -- -- 0.105 –0.036 –0.137 
  -- -- -- (1.71)* (–0.56) (–2.04) 
VAR22 -- -- -- –0.086 –0.113 –0.239 
  -- -- -- (–1.68)* (–2.10)** (–4.28)** 
Regional             
belief             
fixed effects             
VAR16MA -- -- -- –0.276 –0.167 –0.075 
  -- -- -- (–3.06)*** (–1.75)* (–0.76) 
VAR1MA -- -- -- 0.034 0.015 0.015 
  -- -- -- (2.17)** (0.89) (0.94) 
Constant 0.587 0.369 0.552 0.715 0.733 0.492 
  (16.63)*** (10.11)*** (21.49)*** (24.89)*** (24.16)*** (15.69)*** 
R2 0.005 0.016 0.040 0.029 0.026 0.038 
Note: We report OLS estimates with t-statistics in parenthesis (*significant at 10%, 
**significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%). As in AA, Probit and Logit also give similar 
results than OLS. 
 
We confirm a strong correlation that is statistically significant between DEP, VAR17* 
and VAR17 in 1995 VAR17 (i.e. common determinants in Spain in 1995 both for being 
leftist, preferences for income equality and government distribution). Regardless of 
the use of DEP, VAR17 and VAR17*, we confirm that (1) years of education, basically at 
university level (VAR22) is the most important factor to determine preferences of 
Spanish individuals for redistribution in 1995, (2) regional beliefs-fixed effects are 
relevant when using DEP although not with VAR17 and VAR17*, (3) regional–fixed 
effects are relevant for Madrid both when using DEP and VAR17, and they have the 
same sign: evidence of a strong right-wing group in Madrid in 1995. 
The most important difference with AA is that VAR1, is found to have a positive 
influence in Spain both when using DEP and VAR17* that is not statistically significant. 
With VAR17, the estimate is negative. 
Year 2007 
The results for 2007 are given in Table 2. Note that now, income (VAR3) and the group 
age effects (from VAR11 to VAR15) are the relevant ones in Spain and they have the 
expected sign as in AA. In contrast, the years of education (VAR5) does not have such a 
strong influence as in 1995. 
Model 3 confirms the existence of regional–fixed effects in Cataluña and some 
evidence in Galicia, Navarra and Castilla La Mancha. The regional–fixed effect in 
Cataluña indicates the relevance of a strong left-wing group in 2007 and this result is 
very robust in all the ten models that we consider. Not only the regional–fixed effect in 
Cataluña is estimated to be positive, but also it is highly statistically significant. We also 
detect in some models the existence of a left-wing group in Navarra and a right-wing 
group in Castilla La Mancha and in Galicia in this period, although they are not as 
strong as in Cataluña. 
We now find moderate evidence that aggregate belief that luck determines income in 
Spain has a positive relationship with the probability of being leftist, although the 
result is not that strong as in AA. There is therefore some evidence of more 
homogeneous beliefs in Spain in this period that allows to identify an aggregate belief 
in Spain. Moreover, regional belief effects are not statistically significant anymore 
when compared to the situation in 1995. 
Finally, in relation to the geography/income and sociodemographic aspects that may 
affect individuals in Spain to increase their demand for redistribution, we do not find 
that years of education is the relevant determinant as it happened in 1995. In 2007, we 
find that income (VAR3) and age of individuals (VAR11 to VAR15) are the main 
determinants to contribute to the probability of individuals to be leftist. The estimated 
signs of those variables are the same as those reported in AA. Indeed, this evidence 
conforms to standard economic reasoning. Richer people, who have least to gain from 
redistribution, are usually less keen on it than their poorer compatriots. 
These changes in the influence of education could be explained if we assume that the 
level of studies can act in an ambivalent way (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011 Alesina, A. 
and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, 
Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931). In general, in those societies where this 
variable is a crucial factor in income differences, the level of education is linked to the 
possibilities of social improvement in a way that those individuals will present less 
preferences for redistribution (as in Spain in 1995). Later, once education levels have 
increased significantly in many segments of the population and it is more generalized, 
including the highest levels of education (as happens in Spain in 2007), this variable 
starts to be less significant and that explains our results. In fact, the number of years of 
education increased, on average, from 3.80 to 4.67 in the 1995 to 2007 period. In the 
Spanish case this evolution is closely linked with the effect of redistributive policies 
implemented in those years. As an evidence of this effect, we can mention the large 
increase in the percentage of Spanish population that have obtained a degree; from 17 
% in 1995 to 29% in 2007. On the other hand, the increase of educational levels in the 
population also seems to be linked to attitudes that are in favour of redistribution. 
In Table 4 , we show the dependence between DEP, VAR17 and VAR17*, and we also 
show the robustness of our results in the previous section when we replace DEP by 
VAR17*. We use the same variables as in table 7 in Alesina and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, 
A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, 
Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931) and therefore we create a variable that 
measures age (VAR19). The square of age is not statistically significant in any of the 
regressions in Table 4.  
  
Table 4. The effect of the belief that luck determines income on being left 
on the political spectrum (DEP), income distribution (VAR17*) and 
government distribution (VAR17) in Spain in 2007 
Dependent variable 
Models VAR17 VAR17* VAR17 DEP VAR17 VAR17* 
VAR17* -- -- 0.370 -- -- -- 
  -- -- (13.00)*** -- -- -- 
VAR17 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
DEP 0.058 0.068 -- -- -- -- 
  (1.68)* (1.85)* -- -- -- -- 
Aggregate             
belief             
VAR1 -- -- -- 0.005 –0.058 –0.046 
  -- -- -- (0.69) (–7.52)*** (–5.34)*** 
Geography             
/income             
VAR3 -- -- -- –0.044 –0.043 –0.044 
  -- -- -- (–5.07)*** (–4.68)*** (–4.44)*** 
Socio-             
demography             
VAR19 -- -- -- –0.004 –0.001 0.001 
  -- -- -- (–5.53)*** (–0.89) (0.96) 
VAR19 squared -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Regional             
belief             
fixed effects             
VAR16CAT -- -- -- 0.212 –0.234 –0.279 
  -- -- -- (2.44)** (–2.58)** (–2.86)*** 
VAR1CAT -- -- -- 0.005 0.033 0.030 
        (0.30) (1.84)* (1.52) 
Constant 0.639 0.394 0.517 1.078 1.169 0.814 
  (21.63)*** (12.51)*** (27.24)*** (15.67)*** (16.29)*** (10.53)*** 
R2 0.003 0.004 0.156 0.07 0.09 0.07 
Note: We report OLS estimates with t-statistics in parenthesis (*significant at 10%, 
**significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%). As in AA, Probit and Logit also give similar 
results than OLS.  
We confirm again a strong correlation that is statistically significant between DEP, 
VAR17 and VAR17* and both in 1995 and in 2007. 
Regardless of the use of DEP, VAR17 and VAR17* (i.e. common determinants in Spain 
in 2007 for being leftist, preferences for income equality and government distribution), 
we confirm that (1) income (VAR3) is the most important factor to determine 
preferences of Spanish individuals for redistribution in 2007, (2) regional beliefs-fixed 
effects are relevant both when using DEP and VAR17* and they are only moderately 
relevant when using preferences for government redistribution and (3) regional–fixed 
effects are relevant for Cataluña. 
Now, the most important difference with AA is that estimated effect of VAR1 is 
positive when using DEP although not statistically significant. With VAR17* and VAR17, 
the estimate is negative and statistically significant. 
The change observed in the sign of the relation between the belief that luck 
determines income (VAR1) and preferences for equality (VAR17*) should be 
interpreted with caution. The question about income inequality in the WVS does not 
directly capture awareness of how much inequality there is. Instead, it mixes both 
awareness of the degree of inequality and attitudes about the fairness of that 
perceived level of inequality. Then changes in responses to this question could be a 
consequence of changes in people’s views about how much inequality there is 
(Kenworthy and McCall, 2008 Landier, A., Thesmar, D. and Thoenig, M. (2008) 
Investigating capitalism aversion, Economic Policy, 23, 465–97. 
IV. Conclusions 
This article analyses the main factors determining the demand for redistribution in 
Spain both at an aggregate and regional level. Particularly, we posed three research 
questions: (1) does the belief that society is unfair have a significant effect on the 
individuals’ preferences for redistribution?, (2) are regional beliefs in all Spanish 
regions equally important when determining demand for redistribution? and (3) have 
the preferences for redistribution changed over time? 
In order to answer those questions, we estimate ten models in which preferences for 
redistribution are initially proxied by the ideological self-positioning of individuals. The 
data source for our estimations is the results World Values Survey (1995 and 2007 
waves). 
The main finding of this study is the existence of a structural change in preferences 
formation for redistribution in Spain between 1995 and 2007. Some of those crucial 
changes can be summarized as follows. 
First, in 1995, we provide evidence that one of the most important factors that 
determine individuals’ political choices is the level of studies (years of education). 
Variables such as race, marital status, age or gender are not relevant in Spain in this 
period as explanatory variables. However, in 2007, the variable years of education is 
no longer significant. In this year, income and age of individuals are the main 
determinants of the probability of individuals to be leftist. 
Second, our results show in 1995 that only the luck-effort variable is significant only in 
some of the regions. In special, it is a determinant variable in Madrid. In 2007 this 
variable is slightly significant for all regions. This evidence suggests that the belief that 
the system is unfair, i.e. success is determined by luck, tends to increase the 
probability of strong preferences for redistribution in Spain at an aggregate level. In 
this sense, the situation in Spain is more similar in 2007 to the results given in AA 
although regional beliefs are still very relevant in Spain and therefore we argue that 
they must be introduced in the model of AA in Spain. However, beliefs about the 
importance of good or bad luck in determining high or low incomes is not the decisive 
source of differences in individual demand for redistribution. 
Third, the regional–fixed effects allow us to support the hypothesis that some regions 
in Spain were more left or right-wing. That is, people in certain regions (i.e. Madrid in 
1995/Cataluña in 2007) tend to favour less/more redistribution than other regions. 
This evidence suggests that particular circumstances in these regions (cultural, 
political, etc.) make people with similar income and education show different attitudes 
towards redistribution. In fact, we find evidence of some regions having strong leftist 
beliefs or being more right-wing. A possible explanation for these changes in 
preferences at a regional level may be related with the orientation of redistributive 
policies pursued (supply-side) by regional governments. Policies adopted by the 
regional governments could influence the individual attitudes towards redistribution 
and, therefore, these attitudes can change over time depending on the political 
orientation of the government in office during the years before the survey was 
conducted 
Finally, we confirm a strong correlation that is statistically significant between being 
leftist, preferences for income equality and government distribution both in 1995 and 
in 2007. This result can be interpreted as suggesting the existence of common 
determinants in Spain for those variables. 
As a future line of research, we could study how this temporary evolution of 
redistribution preferences in Spain may be linked to the rapid social changes that have 
taken place from 1995 to 2007, both in terms of an increase in income level and in the 
incorporation of a great influx of immigrants (since 1980, the percentage of 
immigrants in the total population in Spain has increased from around 1.5% to more 
than 12% in 2010). In fact, there are many studies that show that altruism has many 
cultural and racial barriers: when we have a group of people that not only have low 
income but also belong to a racial or cultural minority, the majority of people tend to 
decrease their preferences for redistribution. In general, most of the individuals tend 
to feel more generous with those they feel closer to culturally and racially (see Alesina 
et al., 2001 Alesina, A. and Glaeser, E. (2004) Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004 Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. 
(2011) Preferences for redistribution, in Handbook of Social Economics (Eds.) A. Bisin 
and J. Benhabib, North Holland, The Netherlands, pp. 93–132.; Akkoyunlu et al., 2009 
Akkoyunlu, S., Neustadt, I. and Zweifel, P. (2009) Why does the amount of income 
redistribution differ between United States and Europe? The Janus Face of 
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Appendix 
A.1 Variables 
The variables that are used by AA are given as follows: The dependent variable (DEP) 
corresponds to ‘Being left on the political spectrum’. It answers the question at the 
aggregate (all regions) level in Spain: ‘In political matters, people talk of left and right. 
How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?’. It is a variable that 
ranges from 1 to 10, 1 being the most leftist. Following AA, we classified leftist as 
anyone in Spain who answered with a score of 5 or below. The dependent variable 
corresponds in the EVS for Spain to the references: e033 in 1990, V123 in 1995 and 
V114 in 2007. The independent variables, following AA (Table 2) are: VAR1: ‘Individual 
belief that luck determines income’. It corresponds to the answer to the question: ‘In 
the long run, hard work usually brings a better life. Or, hard work does not generally 
bring success; it’s more a matter of luck and connections’. It is a variable that ranges 
from 1 to 10. Following AA, answers are recoded on a scale 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the 
strongest belief in luck. This varia ble is not available in the EVS for 2000, and this 
prevent us from showing the Spanish analysis in 2000. The variable corresponds in the 
EVS for Spain to the references: e040 in 1990, V129 in 1995 and V120 in 2007. VAR2: 
‘Gini Index’. We obtain the Gini Index for the 17 Spanish regions in 1995 from 
Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2007 Kenworthy, L. and McCall, L. (2008) Inequality, public 
opinion and redistribution, Socio-Economic Review, 6, 35–68.). For 1990 and 2000 in 
Spain, VAR2 is available in Cañón, et al. (2005 Cañón, L. A., Málagay, A. J. and 
Chaparro, F. P. (2005) Desigualdad y Bienestar en la Distribución Intraterritorial de la 
Renta, 1973–2000, Working Paper Series, P. T. N.o 6/05, Papeles de Trabajo del 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid. ). We decide in 2007 to take the values coming 
from Iglesias-Fernández et al. (2009 Izquierdo, M. and Lacuesta, A. (2007) Wage 
inequality in Spain, recent developments, Working Paper Series No. 781, European 
Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main) where the Gini index is disaggregated by gender. We 
weight those indexes with the average number of females/males of VAR9 in 2007 in 
Spain to construct a proxy of the aggregate Gini index. VAR3: ‘Income’. The variable 
corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x047 in 1990, V227 in 1995 and V253 in 2007. 
VAR4: ‘City Population’. The variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x049 in 1990, 
V232 in 1995 and V255SC in 2007. VAR5: “Years of education”. The variable 
corresponds in the EVS for Spain to V217 in 1995 and V238 in 2007. This variable is not 
available in Spain in 1990. VAR6: ‘White’. The variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain 
to x051 in 1990, V233 in 1995 and this variable is not available in the survey in 2007 
for Spain. We argue that given the race structure in the Spain, since more than 98% of 
the Spanish population is white, this variable is not important in the Spanish case. 
VAR7: ‘Married’. The variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x007 in 1990, V89 in 
1995 and V55 in 2007. VAR8: ‘Number of Children’. The variable corresponds in the 
EVS for Spain to x011 in 1990, V90 in 1995 and V56 in 2007. VAR9: ‘Female’. The 
variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x001 in 1990, V214 in 1995 and V235 in 
2007. VAR10: in AA it corresponds to “US resident”. In order to adapt it to the Spanish 
case, we have taken the answer to the question: ‘At which geographical group would 
you say that you belong to?’, with possible answers: (1) to the local entity/city where it 
lives, (2) to the regional area, (3) Spain in general, (4) Europe and (5) the world. We 
argue that this gives a measure of how attached individuals feel with their 
local/regional area. Answers are recoded on a scale 0 to 1. The variable corresponds in 
the EVS for Spain to g015 in 1990, V203 in 1995 and V211 in 2007. VAR11: ‘Age group 
18–24’. The variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x003 in 1990, V216 in 1995 
and V237 in 2007. VAR12: ‘Age group 25–34’. The variable corresponds in the EVS for 
Spain to x003 in 1990, V216 in 1995 and V237 in 2007. VAR13: ‘Age group 35–44’. The 
variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x003 in 1990, V216 in 1995 and V237 in 
2007. VAR14: ‘Age group 45–54’. The variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x003 
in 1990, V216 in 1995 and V237 in 2007. VAR15: ‘Age group 55–64’. The variable 
corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x003 in 1990, V216 in 1995 and V237 in 2007. We 
incorporate a new variable that is not included in AA. VAR16: ‘Region where the survey 
was carried out’ in Spain. This allows to introduce regional-fixed effects (for Spain). The 
variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x048 in 1990, V234 in 1995 and V257 in 
2007. We name: VAR16i with AN, AR, AS, B, CAT, CANA, CANT, CASLE, CASLA, E, 
G, R, MA, MU, NA, PVAS, PVAL to denote the fixed effects corresponding to Andalucía, 
Aragón, Asturias, Baleares, Cataluña, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla-León, Castilla-La 
Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia, Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, País Vasco and País 
Valenciano. We choose País Valenciano as our reference group. These regional–fixed 
effects allow to support the hypothesis if some regions in Spain were more left–or 
right-wing and if we find statistical evidence of that. 
We also need to incorporate the following variables to analyse the model of Alesina 
and Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution 
in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931, table 7) and 
García-Valiñas et al. (2008): VAR17: Preferences for redistribution. The variable 
corresponds in the EVS for Spain to e037 in 1990, V127 in 1995 and V118 in 2007. 
Since in the EVS this variable takes values 1–10 (opposite to 1–5 in Alesina and 
Giuliano (2011 Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the 
land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931.), we rescale the 
variable, as in AA for DEP, from 0 to 1, and we set 1 when the individual answered 5 or 
below. VAR17*: Incomes more equal. Variable used in García-Valiñas etal. (2008) as a 
measure of preferences for redistribution. The variable corresponds in the EVS for 
Spain to e035 in 1990, V125 in 1995 and V116 in 2007. VAR18: Fairness. The variable 
corresponds in the EVS for Spain to a168 in 1990, V27 in 1995 and V47 in 2007. This 
variable also takes values 1–10 in the EVS in 2007. We set a value equal to 2 when the 
variable takes values 5 or below, and 1 otherwise, as in Alesina and Giuliano (2011 
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of 
opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931.). VAR19: Age. The variable 
corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x003 in 1990, V216 in 1995 and V237 in 2007. 
VAR20: Unemployment. The variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to x028 in 1990, 
V220 in 1995 and V241 in 2007. VAR21: High School. The variable corresponds in the 
EVS for Spain V217 in 1995 and V238 in 2007. This variable is not available in Spain in 
1990. VAR22: College and more. The variable corresponds in the EVS for Spain to V217 
in 1995 and V238 in 2007. This variable is not available in Spain in 1990. 
A.2 Models 
MODEL 1: It corresponds to Model 2 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain without regional–
fixed effects. 
MODEL 2: It corresponds to Model 3 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain without regional–
fixed effects. We can see clearly how VAR2 is not statistically significant in Spain. 
MODEL 3: It corresponds to Model 2 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects. 
MODEL 4: It corresponds to Model 2 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects for Madrid, Navarra and Pais Vasco and where we remove those variables 
that are not statistically significant in Model 3. 
MODEL 5: It corresponds to Model 1 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects for Madrid, Navarra and Pais Vasco and where we remove those variables 
that are not statistically significant in Model 3. 
MODEL 6: It corresponds to Model 2 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects and with aggregate (i.e. VAR1) and regional beliefs (i.e. VAR1MA, VAR1NA 
and VAR1PVAS). We have created several variables that were not used in AA to 
introduce belief-fixed effects in the analysis: for example VAR1MA (theiteration effect 
of VAR1 with VAR16MA), VAR1NA (the iteration effect of VAR1 with VAR16NA) and 
VAR1PVAS (the iteration effect of VAR1 with VAR16PVAS) respectively. 
MODEL 7: It corresponds to Model 2 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects for Madrid, Navarra and Pais Vasco, with aggregate (i.e. VAR1) 
andregional beliefs (i.e. VAR1MA, VAR1NA and VAR1PVAS), and where we remove 
those variables that are not statistically significant in Model 6. 
MODEL 8: It corresponds to Model 2 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects for Madrid, with regional beliefs in Madrid (i.e. VAR1MA), and where we 
remove those variables that are not statistically significant in Model 6. 
MODEL 9: It corresponds to Model 1 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects for Madrid, with regional beliefs in Madrid (i.e. VAR1MA), and where we 
remove those variables that are not statistically significant in Model 8. We also remove 
VAR4 because it was not statistically significant in Model 7 to check the robustness of 
our result for the relationship between VAR1MA and DEP. 
MODEL 10: It corresponds to Model 1 in AA (table 2, p. 964) for Spain with regional–
fixed effects for Madrid, with regional beliefs in Madrid (i.e. VAR1MA), and where we 
remove VAR8 from Model 9 since it was not statistically significant in Models 1, 3 and 6 
to check the robustness of our result for the relationship between VAR1MA and DEP. 
Note also that VAR5 (years of education) is consistently found to have a negative 
impact on the probability of being right-wing in Spain in all Models 1–10. 
Notes 
1 For a literature review of the factors influencing preferences see Akkoyunlu et al. 
(2009 Akkoyunlu, S., Neustadt, I. and Zweifel, P. (2009) Why does the amount of 
income redistribution differ between United States and Europe? The Janus Face of 
Switzerland. SOI Working Paper No. 0810, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic 
Institute, Zurich. ) and Alesina and Giulano (2011). 
2 Benabou and Ok (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005 Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G.-
M. (2005) Fairness and redistribution, The American Economic Review, 95, 960–80.) 
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005 Alesina, A., Glaeser, E. and Sacerdote, B. (2001) Why 
doesn’t the United States have a European-style welfare state?, Brooking Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2, 187–277.). 
3 That implies that we may have some issues with the sample representativeness. 
Some methods to guarantee the representativeness involve the use of weights (see for 
example Ayala et al., 2006 Ayala, L., Navarro, C. and Sastre, M. (2006), La Attrition en 
el Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea: ¿Cómo influye en la Movilidad de Ingresos?, 
XIII Encuentro de Economía Poíltica, Almería. ); however, in our case it is not obvious 
how those weights may be implemented. We have checked that the descriptive 
statistics of all variables did not change substantially when we have removed from the 
sample those individuals where at least one of the variables show a ‘no-answer’. Even 
so, we acknowledge that our results mainly for 1995 may be affected by sample 
selection issues. 
4 Tables with the descriptive statistics of all variables (including those that we need to 
analyse the setting of García-Valiñas et al. (2008) and Alesina and Giuliano (2011 
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) Preferences for redistribution in the land of 
opportunities, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897–931.)) can be obtained from any of 
the authors upon request. 
5 A more detailed description of the variables can be seen in Appendix 1. A very similar 
specification can be found in Neher (2012 Panizza, U. (1999) On the determinants of 
fiscal centralization: theory and evidence, Journal of Public Economics, 74, 97–139.). 
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